The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Taiwan Relations Act: Enduring Framework or Accidental Success by Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng
Ithaca College
Digital Commons @ IC
Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations Politics Department
1-1-2011
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Taiwan
Relations Act: Enduring Framework or Accidental
Success
Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang
Ithaca College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics Department at Digital Commons @ IC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ IC.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Taiwan Relations Act: Enduring Framework or Accidental Success"
(2011). Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations. 44.
https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs/44
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: 
ENDURING FRAMEWORK 
OR ACCIDENTAL SUCCESS? 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
This chapter examines a unique feature and important factor that helps 
shape the changing dynamics of the relations among China, Taiwan, and 
the United States - the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). More than thirty 
years ago, on 15 December 1978, United States President Jimmy Carter 
announced that the U.S. government would terminate diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and recognize the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The news unsettled my 
carefree days as a freshman at National Taiwan University. The mood on 
campus was gloomy and pessimism permeated the society. Many people 
felt betrayed, and the future looked uncertain. While its "economic 
miracle" had taken off by then, Taiwan's democratic transition was just in 
its infancy. Per capita GNP was US$1,958 (in current prices). 
Three decades later, Taiwan has evolved into a full-fledged democracy 
(one of the freest in Asia and the sole democracy in all ethnic Chinese 
societies), with a per capita GDP over US$17,000 (or over US$30,000 in 
purchasing power parity) in 2009. The hardworking people of Taiwan and 
sound politico-economic management deserve most of the credit. 
However, these accomplishments also benefited from the peace and 
security arguably engendered by an extraordinary framework - the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA). Enacted in 1979 by the United States Congress 
dissatisfied with the way President Jimmy Carter handled the normalization 
issue, the TRA has guided U.S.-Taiwan relations for over three decades -
a feat few could have anticipated. Many would argue that the TRA has 
also contributed to peace and stability in the Western Pacific and gradual 
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improvement of relations across the Taiwan Strait. But the TRA's future 
cannot be taken for granted. The thirtieth anniversary of the TRA thus 
calls for reflection on the past and a surmising of the future. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one discusses the 
unique aspects of the TRA that contribute to its resilience. Section two 
evaluates the successes and shortcomings of the TRA. Section three 
speculates about the future of the TRA. While the TRA's implications for 
the people on Taiwan are clear, section four discusses some of the 
implications of the TRA for the Chinese people on the mainland and cross-
Strait relations. 
A Unique Legislation 
To analyze the roles played by the TRA, it is useful to consider the 
diplomatic and political quandary faced by the U.S. in 1979. Jacob K. 
Javits, U.S. Senator from New York from 1957 to 1981, might have 
spoken for many Americans: "We could no longer operate under the 
fiction that the government in Taipei was the government of all China, but 
neither could we ignore the fact that .the people of Taiwan had been our 
friends and allies for decades and that we had assisted in protecting them 
from domination by the communist regime on the mainland."1 The TRA, 
as Stephen Solarz, the former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs of the House of Representatives, put it, was thus 
enacted "to solve an unprecedented diplomatic problem: How to continue 
U.S. substantive relations with the people on Taiwan even though the U.S. 
government terminated diplomatic relations with the government in Taipei, 
as a precondition for normalization of relations with Beijing. "2 
Under conventional international law, an unrecognized state is severely 
handicapped. Typically it cannot have access to the courts of the state 
refusing recognition. But the TRA created an important exception to this 
rule. Section 4 states that "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or 
relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, 
such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to 
Taiwan."3 Eminent legal scholar Gerhard von Glahn argued that the TRA 
1 Jacob K. Javits, "Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act," 
foreign Affairs, No. 60 (1981-82) p. 56. . . 
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, SubcomIIllttees on Human Rights and 
International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Implementation of 
the Taiwan Relations Act, Hearing and Markup, May 7, June 25, and August 1, 
} 986 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987) p. l. 
U.S. Public Law 96-8, 961h Congress, April 10, 1979. 
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caused the U.S. to treat Taiwan as a state and its governing authorities as a 
government, despite the formal derecognition of both by the U.S.4 
Indeed, as Columbia University Law professor Lori Fisler Darnrosch, 
who served in the State Department Legal Advisor's Office and participated 
in the preparation of the TRA, pointed out, despite the U.S. government's 
acknowledgement of the Chinese position that Taiwan was a part of China, 
the U.S. continued granting Taiwan such trade benefits as MFN (most-
favored-nation) and GSP (Generalized System of Preferences), while 
China, with a socialist economy at that time, received neither. U.S. courts 
consistently applied the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to 
Taiwan. The law says a foreign state is immune from suits in the U.S. for 
acts undertaken in official capacity.5 Similarly, the nominally "unofficial" 
American Institute in Taiwan is accorded with sovereign immunity.6 
The TRA defines U.S. policy toward the ROC so extensively - in the 
fields of trade, cultural, defense, and other relations and preserves the legal 
status of the ROC under U.S. laws and in U.S. federal and state courts -
that J. Terry Emerson, former legal counsel to Senator Barry Goldwater, 
concluded, "All that was missing from this legislation ... was a provision 
for formal diplomatic relations."7 
The TRA is thus a unique legislation. Its pragmatic arrangements of 
relations between the U.S. and Taiwan after 1979 fill a lacuna in 
traditional international law. However, America's concern for a former 
ally's fate cannot fully explain this innovation. Real U.S. interests were 
involved. The U.S. was Taiwan's largest trading partner (accounting for 
32.3% of Taiwan's foreign trade in the first half of 1978); and Taiwan was 
the eighth largest trading partner of the U.S.8 A secure Taiwan was key to 
peace and stability in the Western Pacific - a region vital to U.S. interests. 
The U.S.'s reputation among its allies in the region was also on the line. 
4 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International 
Law, 7th Ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996) p. 85. 
5 Lori Fisler Darnrosch, ''The Taiwan Relations Act: After Ten Years," Journal of 
Chinese Law, No. 3 (1989) pp. 157-183. 
6 
"Sovereign Immunity Accorded to American Institute in Taiwan," The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 95 (2001) pp. 629-630. 
7 J. Terry Emerson, "What Determines U.S. Relations with China: The Taiwan 
Relations Act or the August 17 Communique with Beijing?" Asian Studies Center 
Backgrounder (Heritage Foundation, 1987) p. 1. Emerson cited a case: "A U.S. 
District Court has found that the range of ties established by the TRA is so 
extensive that 'quasi-governmental relations' are provided by the Act." Chang v. 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 [note 3][N.D.Ill. 1980], 
quoted in ibid., p. 2. 
8 Damrosch, ''The Taiwan Relations Act," p. 159. 
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So the TRA blends realism and idealism, and this is a reason for the wide 
bipartisan support it has received. 
The TRA was a unique legislation in a second way. Politically, the 
TRA resulted from a rare kind of equilibrium (with intrinsic ambiguities 
and tensions arising from the American political system of separation of 
powers and checks and balances) between the Congress whose unusual 
coalition wanted to "do something" for Taiwan, reasserting itself in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, and the executive branch, which typically 
enjoyed an upper hand on foreign policy. 9 To the extent the TRA 
mandates executive-legislative joint responsibility for Taiwan's security, 10 
Congress has shown a keen interest in Taiwan that is rare with other 
countries. Senator Jacob Javits commended the TRA as an important 
example of the "unique" and "independent congressional role" in U.S. 
foreign policy. 11 Taiwan was thus able to somewhat compensate its 
disadvantage in gaining executive access due to derecognition with its 
work tapping into the Congress's goodwill toward it. 
Third, the TRA was unique in that it was designed conceptually as a 
transitory legislation: a pragmatic but exceptional arrangement for 
Taiwan during a period of diplomatic.limbo caused by U.S. derecognition 
in 1979. Theoretically, if Taiwan declares de jure independence and 
establishes an independent, sovereign Taiwan state, the TRA would 
become unnecessary, because the President of the U.S. has ample 
authority to recognize such a state and establish diplomatic relations with 
it. 12 On the contrary, if Taiwan should decide to peacefully join the 
mainland when the latter becomes freer and more prosperous, the TRA 
would also become obsolete. The TRA was thus enacted in tandem with a 
"status quo" constructed by the U.S. -- essentially no unification for China 
and no recognition for Taiwan. 13 The TRA is studiously silent (or neutral) 
9 For a discussion about the politics of the TRA, see Steven M. Goldstein and 
Randall Schriver, "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan, and the 
Taiwan Relations Act," The China Quarterly, No. 165 (2001) pp. 147-172. 
10 For example, Section 3 mandates that the President and the Congress shall 
determine the nature and quantity of weapons Taiwan needs for its defense and 
requires the President to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security 
of Taiwan. Some scholars, such as Goldstein and Schriver, question whether these 
provisions are not already provided by the U.S. Constitution and relevant laws. 
~ut others argue that Congress makes laws (e.g., the TRA), and the President's job 
is to faithfully implement the laws made by Congress. Emerson, "What 
Determines." 
11 J . "C 
12 av1ts, ongress and Foreign Relations," p. 54. 
13 Damrosch, p. 182. . For vivid evidence that the "status quo" is a construct, rather than a reality, see 
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on the resolution of Taiwan's ultimate status, as long as it is achieved 
through peaceful means. In other words, it insists on a process, but not a 
particular outcome. It neither endorses nor precludes eventual unification 
of Taiwan with China, nor their separation.14 
Despite its pragmatic origin, ambiguous nature, and transitory design, 
the TRA has guided U.S.-Taiwan relations for thirty-one years - longer 
than many had anticipated. Does this mean that the TRA is a "durable 
agreement or a fraying framework"? 15 While it is implausible that 
Taiwan's progress or U.S.-Taiwan relations could have been better without 
the TRA, it is equally far-fetched to attribute all the credit to the TRA. 
Successes and Failures 
The TRA's resilience stems from its protection of Taiwan's three core 
interests: economic, security, and democracy and from the alignment of 
U.S. interests with Taiwan's in these areas. 
Commercial Relations 
Taiwan's economic development strategy has been described as 
export-led growth (ELG), which requires maintaining an outward-oriented 
economy. Historically, the U.S. was crucial to Taiwan's ELG strategy as a 
large market for finished manufactured goods and as an important source 
for technological know-how and capital. Taiwan's information technology 
(IT) industry, a mainstay of its exports, exemplifies this close relationship. 
From 1981to2007, two-way trade between the U.S. and Taiwan increased 
five-fold from $12.1 billion to $65 billion (accounting for 12.6% of 
former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. 
Kelly, "Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," testimony at the U.S. House 
International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649pf.htm. When pressed to explain 
"status quo," Kelly could only say "The U.S. does not support unilateral moves 
that would change the status quo as we define it. For Beijing, this means no use of 
force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising 
prudence in managing all aspects of cross-strait relations. For both sides, it means 
no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status." 
14 Damrosch, p. 181. 
15 Avery Goldstein, "E-Notes: The Taiwan Relations Act: Durable Agreement or 
Fraying Framework? A Conference Report," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
September 8, 1999, 
http://fpri.org/enotes/l 9990908.goldstein. taiwanrelationsact.html. 
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Taiwan's exports and 12% of its imports). The U.S. remained Taiwan's 
largest trading partner until 2004, when it was surpassed by China. 
Taiwan is currently the United States' ninth-largest trading partner. On 
average, each person in Taiwan imported $1,243 from the U.S. in 2007.16 
Thus, Taiwan and the U.S. are quite important to each other. 
From 1980 to 2007, Taiwan's GNP increased 9.3 times (from $42.3 
billion to $393.8 billion, in current prices), while its GNP per capita rose 
7.2 times (from $2,394 to $17,252, in current prices). 17 Rapid growth 
based on ELG enabled Taiwan to quickly transform from a former 
recipient of U.S. aid to a creditor. For example, in 1979, it had $2 billion 
in foreign exchange reserves. As of July 2008, it had the world's fifth 
largest foreign exchange reserves at $291 billion.18 
Could these impressive results have happened naturally, or without the 
TRA? Conceivably, they could have. However, considering that the TRA 
provided a legal framework that allowed commercial relations between the 
U.S. and Taiwan to develop normally without the adverse effects from the 
derecognition of Taiwan, the TRA most likely contributed to the growth in 
U.S.-Taiwan commercial ties, Tai\\'.an's foreign trade, and Taiwan's 
prosperity stemming from ELG. Because the TRA treats Taiwan as a state 
different from the PRC, Taiwan enjoys more ready access to U.S. high 
technology than China. 
Security Commitment 
To consummate normalization with the PRC, Carter abrogated the 
1954 USA-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty without providing a clear 
commitment to Taiwan's security. Nor was he able to extract from the 
PRC a renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan. Congress went to 
work and significantly enhanced the U.S.'s commitment to Taiwan's 
security after derecognition. The TRA affirms a concern for Taiwan's 
security in no uncertain terms. Of the six policy statements contained in 
section 2(b), four stress the interest of the U.S. in peace, stability, and 
security in the Western Pacific and in ensuring that Taiwan's future is 
determined by peaceful means. The TRA also declares that the U.S. will 
16 U.S. International Trade Commission, Operations of the Trade Agreements 
Program (annual reports prepared in conformity with Section 163(b) of the Trade 
Act of 1974); U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Taiwan," 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.html, accessed 29 December 2008. 
17 Council on Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Databook, 
2008 (Taipei: CEPD, 2008) p. 17. 
18 Department of State, "Background Note: Taiwan." 
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"make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in 
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability" and the U.S. will maintain "the capacity 
to resist any resort to force ... that would jeopardize the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." 
Scholars have debated about the essence of these security provisions. 
Some say that since the "strategic ambiguity" inherent in the TRA is 
intended to deter both Beijing's use of force and Taipei's provocation, as 
long as this "dual deterrence" works, the TRA is nothing more than a piece 
of paper. The U.S. is not obligated to come to Taiwan's defense, but can 
choose to do so. Others contend that the TRA can be implemented like 
(perhaps more than) a defense treaty. For example, the typical defense 
treaty only covers "armed attack" on partners' soil; the TRA covers more. 
Thus, former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank 
Church, an Idaho Democrat, portrayed the TRA's security provisions as 
"very broad indeed, broader than the objective of the mutual defense treaty, 
which had to do with an attack and only an attack," whereas the TRA has 
considered "not only the security, but also the social and economic system 
of the people on Taiwan," and "not only the resort to force, but other 
forms of coercion."19 
At any rate, the TRA's objective - a s~cure Taiwan capable of self-
defense - complements the U.S. alliance structure in the Western Pacific. 
Although the TRA mandates that the U.S. bases its arms sales to Taiwan 
only Taiwan's defensive needs, such decisions are often carefully 
calibrated in light of the other diplomatic considerations of the U.S. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. has remained Taiwan's main weapons supplier. 
This has been critical for Taiwan's self-defense and confidence, because 
few other major powers are willing to supply Taiwan with weapons 
needed for its own defense. According to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, between 1977 and 2006, Taiwan 
imported US$28.4 billion worth of arms (mostly from the U.S.), making it 
the seventh largest importer of arms in the world. 20 In addition, U.S. 
military actions, such as dispatching carrier groups in 1996 to deter 
China's saber-rattling and revising the U.S.-Japan alliance, were also 
consistent with the TRA. 
19 Hearings on S. 245, Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, February 1979, p. 779. In the House, 
Congressman Lester Wolff agreed: "We have gone far beyond the mutual defense 
treaty ... " 124 Cong. Re3c. 4514. Quoted in Emerson, p. 10. 
20 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. Available at 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/output_types_ TIV .html. 
L 
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Human Rights and Democracy 
In 1979, Taiwan was still a "soft authoritarian" polity. The TRA also 
sought to impress the ruling party (the KMT) that such benefits as 
commercial ties and security commitment were to be bestowed with an 
expectation for greater freedom. Section 2(c) affirms "the preservation 
and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan" as an 
objective of the U.S. In other words, a freer Taiwan respecting human 
rights can make a stronger case for continued and greater U.S. support. 
This gave the incumbent government at that time some incentive to 
liberalize the political system and to better protect human rights. 
Thus, a diplomatic setback ironically provided a catalyst for Taiwan's 
rapid democratization that ensued, although the primary impetuses were 
internal. Thirty years later, Taiwan has evolved into a vibrant democracy 
where all viewpoints about possible future choices, including independence, 
are protected. An increasing number of Americans, including former U.S. 
Congressman Henry Hyde, who was chairman of the House International 
Relations Committee, consider Taiwan's democracy of great political and 
strategic importance to the U.S., because it is a beacon for China, and only 
when China becomes free will the Taiwan issue be resolved and can the 
U.S. and China have truly friendly relations.21 
Shortcomings 
While the TRA contributed to Taiwan's security, prosperity, and 
freedom, it did not increase Taiwan's dignity.22 Section 4(d) of the TRA 
took a passive approach to Taiwan's international space: "Nothing in this 
Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion 
of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial 
institution or any international organization." 
However, the results have been quite different. In 1979, the ROC still 
retained membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. But since then the ROC has been expelled from all UN-affiliated 
21 See the speech given by Henry Hyde, the late Chairman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations, in Taipei on August 24, 
2001, "Rep. Hyde Suggests Taiwan May Hold Key to China's Destiny," e-mail 
update sent by the U.S. Department of State's "USINFO East Asia" 
iipgeap@PD.STATE.GOV. 
22 It should be noted that this assessment pertains to the overall U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan (particularly the acts - omission or commission - by the executive branch), 
rather than the TRA per se. 
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organizations following its expulsion from the UN in 1971. Thus, it lost 
its membership in the IMF and the World Bank in 1980. In his Three 
Noes statement in 1998, former U.S. President Bill Clinton said the U.S. 
does not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations 
requiring statehood. Clinton's statement (issued at the persistent request 
of PRC officials), though not logically inconsistent with the protocol of 
America's "one China" policy, diminished the room for maneuver for the 
United States regarding shoring up (or at least not further eroding) 
Taiwan's international space. As the world's seventeenth largest 
economy, sixteenth largest trader, and fifth largest foreign exchange earner 
located at international crossroads for commerce and epidemics, the 
ROC's exclusion from IGOs due to non-recognition of its statehood 
(rather than its intrinsic lack thereof) is unfortunate and damaging. The 
U.S. could have done more. Neither the TRA nor U.S. executive actions 
have prevented the erosion of Taiwan's international legal personality. 
Indeed, the issue of Taiwan's international space has become a salient and 
contentious issue. 
Another shortcoming pertains to the outdated self-imposed restrictions 
by the U.S. government to conduct "unofficial relations" with Taiwan 
(protocol). High-ranking officials from Taiwan are still barred from 
visiting the U.S., but the AIT Taipei Office Director can easily see 
Taiwan's president. The lack of direct high-level communication channels 
between Taiwan and the U.S. undermines the quality of communication 
between the two sides. Within the TRA's "unofficiality" model, room still 
exists to improve the quantity and quality of governmental exchanges. 
Whither? 
As the implementation of the TRA enters its fourth decade, one may 
ponder about its future. Will it be changed? Will it become obsolete or 
less relevant, as conditions on the ground, including the evolving cross-
Strait relations, outpace a law enacted more than thirty years ago? 
Looking into the future, the TRA is unlikely to be fundamentally changed 
for three reasons. The first is resilience or inertia. To mitigate the impact 
of the August 17, 1982 Communique, former U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan gave Taiwan "Six Assurances," including that the U.S. would not 
alter the terms of the TRA. 23 Over the years, attempts to shift the TRA 
23 For the text of the August 17 Communique and the Six Assurance, see Kerry 
Dumbaugh, 'Taiwan: Text of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States-China 
Communiques, and the 'Six Assurances,"' CRS Report for Congress (received 
through the CRS Web, updated 21May1998). 
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toward a more or less pro-Taiwan direction have not succeeded.24 The 
unusual legislative-executive equilibrium achieved at the TRA's onset, as 
discussed before, made it hard to deviate. Although implementation by the 
executive is important, Congress does monitor executive implementation 
and ensure a baseline. The two check and balance each other. 
The second is personnel and continuity. Those individuals who 
occupy key positions in the Obama Administration dealing with Taiwan -
such as Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, National Security 
Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader, and Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 
Affairs Derek Mitchell - are all former officials familiar with the 
continuity and nuance of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. 
The third is policy priority. Revitalizing the economy is the Obama 
administration's top priority. He may handle foreign policy challenges, 
such as North Korea, Iran, and the Middle East in a reactive mode, which 
means policy innovation regarding the Taiwan Strait is doubtful. There is 
no urgency, although the Obama administration will have to make a 
decision regarding Taiwan's requests for 60 Black Hawk helicopters and 
66 F-16C/D fighters, which could cause the PRC to again suspend the 
military-to-military dialogue between the U.S. and the PRC. Meanwhile, 
the U.S. will cautiously observe the cross-strait detente pursued by 
Taiwan's Ma Yingjeou administration and calibrate its policy toward 
Taiwan and China.2 Officially, the Obama administration has expressed 
satisfaction with improved cross-Strait relations, which also means that 
there is no incentive to alter the basic legal and policy framework. 
Although the case for the continued validity of the TRA seems 
plausible, three longer-term opposite forces could present a challenge. 
The first is that an increasingly powerful and nationalistic China may 
eventually force unification. As a result of China's rapid military 
modernization (double-digit growth in published annual defense expenditures 
and substantial progress in military capabilities ranging from the Taiwan 
contingencies to scenarios "beyond Taiwan"),26 this prospect has become 
24 One such example was the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 2000, passed 
overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives but eventually tabled in the 
Senate. The text can be found at http://usinfo.org/sino/taiwan_enhance.htm. 
25 Wendell Minnick, "U.S. NSC Reviewing Taiwan Issues," Defense News, 
September 21, 2009. 
26 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military 
Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009, available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military _Power_Report_2009 .pdf. 
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increasingly likely (or at least increasingly less unlikely). It could put the 
clauses in Section 2 of the TRA to test. 
The second challenge is that a democratic Taiwan may aspire to 
upgrade its de facto independence to de jure independence. In other words, 
it may challenge the U.S.-constructed "status quo" which has frozen 
Taiwan in a diplomatic limbo. The Chen Shui-bian administration of 
Taiwan (2000-2008) was perceived as particularly energetic in pushing for 
Taiwan's independence and consequently experienced the limits of U.S. 
support when the George Bush administration leaned harder on Taipei 
than on Beijing. 
A third challenge, not as serious as the previous two, is the "creeping 
unification" between Taiwan and the mainland. Georgetown University 
history professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker posited a provocative but 
important question in 2002, "If Taiwan chooses to peacefully join the 
mainland, should the United States care?"27 This question, unthinkable 
during the Chen administration (2000-2008), gained relevance after Ma 
Ying-jeou, the KMT candidate, came to power after Taiwan's 2008 
presidential election. In contrast to his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, Ma 
made it a top priority to improve cross-Strait relations and reduce tensions 
with both Beijing Washington. Subscribing to its own "one China" 
formula ("one China, each side has its own interpretations", or as "the 
1992 Consensus," a term coined by Chi Su, Ma's national security 
advisor),28 the Ma administration appears to have squarely returned to the 
"status quo" ante (pre-2000). Consequently, cross-Strait relations have 
improved rapidly, compared to the DPP era, as "low-hanging fruits" (e.g., 
direct air links, tourists, and other commercial relations, culminating in the 
landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement signed on 29 
June 201029) have been quickly reaped, but the more difficult issues (e.g., 
international space, confidence-building measures, and a peace agreement) 
remain unresolved.30 Although the Ma administration's moderate approach 
27 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United 
States Care?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25,3 (2002) pp. 15-28. 
28 See Chi Su, Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (London: Routledge, 2008). 
29 A copy of the signed Chinese text of ECFA is available at 
http://ekm92.trade.gov .tw/BOFT/OpenFileService?file_id=e2611Oa384b0c83824a 
20141 e6d4e397 &context=83ee4cf785ad25a257533d1 ac7 c3b82f. The English text 
can be found at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=l 
&menu_id=40&news_id=l 9723. 
30 Alan D. Romberg, "Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy, Now the Hard," China 
Leadership Monitor, No. 28 (2009). See also Philip C. Saunders and Scott Kastner, 
"Bridge Over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement," 
International Security, Vol. 33, 4 (2009) pp. 87-114. 
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toward China has been welcomed by official Washington and Beijing,31 it 
has also caused some unease in Taiwan (the Pan-Green supporters who 
fear that Ma's policies will compromise Taiwan's sovereignty or at least 
take away the independence option) and in the U.S. (those who are 
concerned if the rapprochement between Taiwan and China proceeds 
much faster than U.S. policy can adjust and may harm U.S. interests). 
Ironically, improvement in cross-Strait relations might perversely 
weaken the TRA, as a veteran Taiwanese journalist contends.32 No sooner 
was the ECFA inked then did Chinese scholars and analysts push for 
military confidence-building measures (CBMs).33 The real purpose was to 
remove Taiwan's defense, especially to stop U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
The logic was that CBMs with China would remove threats to Taiwan; 
consequently, Taiwan would have no need for purchasing arms.34 The 
Chinese are particularly interested in wooing Taiwan's retired generals in 
groups (typically with close ties to the KMT) to discuss and promote 
CBMs. Although the Ma administration denied ever authorizing such 
groups to discuss CBMs with their Chinese counterparts, the U.S. 
government has reportedly already voiced its concerns to Taiwan, fearing 
such talks between Taipei and Beijing, bypassing Washington, would 
complicate U.S. policy and adversely affect U.S. interests,35 because the 
31 See Yun-han Chu and Andrew J. Nathan, "Seizing the Opportunity for Change 
in the Taiwan Strait," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31,1 (2007-08) pp. 77-91. 
32 Ching-hung Wang, "Weekly Commentary: Washington's Other Suspicion 
About Ma Ying-jeou" (in Chinese), The Liberty Times, September, 12, 2010. 
33 For an excellent preliminary analysis of cross-Strait CBMs and their impact on 
the U.S., see Bonnie S. Glaser and Ralph Cossa, Building Trust Across the Taiwan 
Strait: A Role for Confidence-Building Measures (January 12, 2010), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/100107 _ Glaser_BuildingTrust_ Web.pdf. 
34 It should be pointed out that the Chinese concept of CBMs -with respect to 
Taiwan is broader and more encompassing than purely military aspects. It 
includes the arrangement of political relationships between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. So, peace accord and unification (under "one country, two systems") 
all fit into this broadly defined CBMs, and the presumption is that China will only 
renounce the use of force or the threat of use of force against Taiwan when China 
and Taiwan have established a political relationship satisfactory to Beijing (or 
Beijing can feel confident about). 
35 Chao-lung Lu and Pei-fen Chou, "Retired Generals Frequently Visit the 
Mainland; the U.S. Closely Watches. In the Past Two Years, the Levels of Such 
Groups Become Increasingly Higher. American Think Tanks Worry that the Two 
Sides of the Taiwan Strait Seek to Develop CBMS by Bypassing Washington. 
[Our Government] Reassures the U.S. that Such Exchanges Have Never Received 
Government Authorization" (in Chinese), The China Times, August 30, 2010, p. 
Al. 
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security provisions in the TRA, particularly U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, are 
based on the following premises: 
• The U.S. has not accepted the PRC's position on Taiwan (i.e., the 
various renditions of a syllogism: there is only one China; Taiwan 
is a part of China; Beijing is the legal government of all China);36 
• Taiwan's security is important to peace and stability in the Western 
Pacific and is in the interests of the U.S.; 
• The PRC has not renounced force or the threat of use of force 
against Taiwan; and 
• U.S. arms sales have deterred China's occasional military 
adventurism, bolstered Taiwan's self-confidence, and helped 
contribute to peace and stability in the region. 
Consequently, this journalist asks if the Ma administration readily 
accepts the one China principle (although Ma's formula is "one China, 
each side has its own interpretation," the Chinese side has insisted the 
"one China" principle and has never explicitly endorsed the "respective 
interpretations" part) and excessively touts the reduction of tensions in the 
36 In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the United States "acknowledges that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 
Taiwan is a part of China." It is important to note that this means that the U.S. 
simply takes notice that this is the Chinese position, but it is not necessarily the 
U.S. position. Indeed, the U.S. essentially repeated the same position in the two 
other later joint communiques with the PRC: "The Government of the United 
States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China 
and Taiwan is part of China" (the January 1, 1979 Communique on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations) and "the United States of America ... 
acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part 
of China" (the August 17, 1982 Communique on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). 
Emphases added. The text of the three joint communiques can be found at Harry 
Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992), pp. 373-390. The last time the U.S. 
government arguably issued its own position on the status of Taiwan was in 1950. 
In ordering the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan (then called 
Formosa) after North Korea had invaded the South, President Harry Truman 
declared: ''The occupation of Fomiosa by Communist forces would be a direct 
threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces" in that area. 
Truman further declared: ''The determination of the future status of Formosa must 
await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or 
consideration by the United Nations." Department of State Bulletin (July 3, 1950) 
p. 5. 
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Taiwan Strait, would this not weaken the rationales for U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan?37 
A further concern is that if the relationships (particularly military 
relationship) between Taiwan and China become too cozy, China might 
gain access to the technologies and secrets embodied in the U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan (both hardware and software). This could cause further 
pause in U.S. decisions to sell weapons to Taiwan, weakening the TRA 
still further. While the above arguments do not seem hitherto supported 
by evidence (after all, the Ma administration continues stressing the 
importance of a robust defense and appears to lobby the U.S. for arms 
sales energetically), logically they cannot be easily dismissed. At any rate, 
skeptics of this stripe fear that if Taiwan decides to bandwagon on China 
(willingly or unwillingly absorbed into China's orbit economically, 
politically, and strategically), the TRA or other foundations of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan or cross-Strait relations would lose their relevance. This 
"status quo-changing by stealth" has not received the same amount of 
attention as either type of explicit status quo-changing, but it is worth 
considering. 
Some people close to the U.S. government thus advocate a review of 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan in light of the new situation. Although it is 
premature to draw any definitive conclusions, it is fair to note that the U.S. 
seems, at this point, to take a cautious approach overall: while commending 
on the reduction of tensions between China and Taiwan and improvement 
of cross-Strait relations, it is also carefully assessing the net impact of such 
developments on U.S. policy and strategic and economic interests. 38 
Regardless, it seems doubtful that even if there is such a review, it will 
abandon the core principles of the TRA. 39 
In light of these long-term trends that point toward different directions, 
can the TRA, enacted in tandem with a U.S.-constructed "status quo" and 
agnostic about Taiwan's ultimate status, continue its practical usefulness? 
Thirty years later, the answer is still not entirely clear. 
:
1 
Wang, "Washington's Other Suspicion." 
8 See Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David 
B. Shear's remarks at the "Cross-Strait Relations in a New Era of Negotiation," 
Conference at the Brookings Institution, July 7, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rrnl2010/07 /144363.htm. 
39 The last time the U.S. government formally implemented a review of its Taiwan 
policy was in 1994 during the Clinton Administration. 
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The TRA's Implications for China 
This chapter will end with a brief reflection on the TRA's implications 
for China and the Chinese people on the mainland. This is an aspect that 
the prevailing discourse on the TRA (for or against) has overlooked but 
nonetheless entails implications for cross-Strait relations, China's future, 
U.S. policy, and the future of the TRA. 
The "conventional wisdom" or "hegemonic discourse" on the TRA in 
the PRC is predictably negative. The Chinese government always reminds 
the U.S. government (especially with each new administration) of America's 
obligations under the three communiques (1972, 1978, and 1982) and 
almost never recognizes the TRA also as a pillar of U.S. policy. Chinese 
officials have steadfastly opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (as mandated 
by the TRA); and on rare occasions when they must address the TRA, they 
contend that the three communiques, which the Chinese view as treaties 
between states, take precedence over a so-called U.S. domestic law. At 
any rate, the official version of Chinese reaction to the TRA is that it is 
invalid and it impedes U.S.-China relations. 
The dominant voices in the Chinese society also tend to echo the 
official line, as can be gleaned from media reports or commentaries (all 
state-controlled) or internet chatrooms. Certain American academics who 
have taught relevant courses in China have also reported that few if any of 
their Chinese students, despite their strong (negative) opinions about the 
TRA, had actually read the text of the TRA (English or Chinese) itself 
(because it could not be found in any textbooks or websites in China), until 
the resourceful American professors managed to secure a copy of the text 
for their students.40 
However, there is a tiny minority, mainly in the intellectual circles, 
who takes a more enlightened view. Although they are Chinese 
nationalists, they appreciate that the U.S. policy in general (and the goals 
enunciated in the TRA in particular) have contributed greatly to the peace 
and stability of the Western Pacific for the past thirty years. This benign 
international environment engendered by the U.S. policy can be seen as a 
"public good" of which China is also a (if not the biggest) beneficiary. 
But more importantly, China's post-1979 grand strategy - pursuing 
national wealth and power through economic development - has 
fortuitously relied on this benign international environment. China has 
wisely taken advantage of the "strategic opportunity" - the three peaceful 
decades since 1979 - to transform itself from a poor and insular nation to a 
40 Lecture by one American professor and personal communication with another -
both have taught American Foreign Policy in China. 
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world power. The TRA deserves at least their grudging gratitude. 
Furthermore, as the effects of the TRA on Taiwan's democratization 
make clear, the TRA's concern for democracy and human rights may also 
provide the enabling environment for transforming a (capable) one-party 
dictatorship into a democracy built upon and consistent with China's own 
culture and history. Admittedly, China is a much larger and more complex 
nation; and its authoritarian legacy is much more entrenched than was 
Taiwan's. However, there is also no other example that is culturally more 
"Chinese" than Taiwan. If one day the TRA should succeed in facilitating 
China's transformation into a democratic polity with greater respect for 
human rights, as it did with Taiwan, then the quality and substance of 
U.S.-China relations will surely change for the better (more affinity and 
trust than suspicion and hedging). The intersubjective identities of China 
and Taiwan will also change for the better, making cross-Strait 
reconciliation (or even union) more likely (as stated earlier, in that 
scenario, the TRA would become unnecessary). If that should happen, 
although the TRA was enacted to· protect Taiwan's interests and to 
regulate U.S.-Taiwan relations, this flexible U.S. domestic law with 
international implications would have achieved a larger unintended 
consequence. 
Although the "framers" of the TRA may or may not have anticipated 
the durability of this supposedly transitory legal framework or the relative 
success of this pragmatic policy tool, the TRA, by blending realism and 
liberalism, has arguably done as well as any other similar U.S. laws or 
domestic laws of any other country. It is fair to say that for over three 
decades, this unique U.S. domestic law has helped to shape the 
international environment of the Asia-Pacific region in a positive way. 
For the coming decade, it remains to be seen whether faster developments 
on the ground will render the TRA obsolescent. 
